Why do we need a Unified Theory of Embodied Cognition?
Presentation for the 94th Joint Session of the Mind Association and the Aristotelian Society. University of Kent, July 2020. Online Open Session. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.11933.74729
The range, diversity and the different metaphysical assumptions of Embodied Cognition (EC) hypotheses that have been formulated in recent years, a) do not allow for their pragmatic, problem-solving oriented adoption by Cognitive Science and (b) favor their fragmentary use by various scientific and practical fields, resulting in misunderstandings concerning their content and validity.
Why Embodied Artificial Intelligence is not so Embodied?
Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy. Volume 45 (2018), Philosophy of Cognitive Sciences pp. 9 - 14. DOI: 10.5840/wcp23201845911
In recent years, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has focused its research interest in the philosophical theories of embodied cognition (EC). Seeking a way out of the GOFAI’s dead-end attempt to develop intelligent robots with the ability to perform complex tasks in unknown and changing environments, AI adopted basic principles of the EC, like the body's direct interactions with the world.
Information at Ockham’s Razor
Symposium: Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence: Needs for New Foundations on the 4th National Conference on the Philosophy of Science, December 2016, Athens, Greece. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.21523.12325
Following the critique of Dreyfus, this announcement focuses on the argument that terms such as “processing”, “calculation” or “flow” of information etc, when used -literally and not figuratively- in order to describe mechanisms that govern systems of different nature, lead to an abusive multiplication of entities without offering (at least until now) any satisfactory solutions towards the convergence of the HC and AI scientific fields.
Can we talk about Intentionality in Eliminative Materialism? The point of view of Embodied Cognition Theories
3rd National Conference on the Philosophy of Science, November 2014, Athens, Greece. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.18587.11041
Today, the problem of intentionality is becoming again relevant in the realm of cognitive science, as during the past decade, important views on embodied cognition attract interest, eliminating mental phenomena and internal representations, broadening the horizon of eliminative theories at the same time. However, the philosophical tradition of these positions on embodied cognition, situated largely on phenomenology, gives intentionality a key role.
Human Cognition and Artificial Intelligence: Searching for the fundamental differences of meaning in the boundaries of metaphysics
4th National Conference on Cognitive Science, June 2013, Athens, Greece. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.17433.67681
While trying to detect common principles and fundamental differences between Human Cognition (HC) and Artificial Intelligence (AI), it is often expedient to look back into the philosophical foundations to face questions that we tend to casually bypass. Such questions, mainly of an epistemological and ontological character, are related to the “nature” of knowledge and signification and more specifically to the way the world has -or can acquire- meaning for cognitive beings.
A Naturalistic Explanation of Meaning within Embodied Cognition Theories
2nd National Conference on the Philosophy of Science, November 2012, Athens, Greece. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.12610.22723/1
This announcement includes: [a] a brief critical survey of the main characteristics that various scientific and philosophical views accredit to embodied cognition and the process of signification, [b] the consequences of these positions regarding the definition of the concept of meaning and [c] a new interpretation for “meaning” as a systemic property of embodied cognition.
Heidegger and Motorcycle Riding: The notions of embodied cognition and skillful coping as a research topic in Cognitive Sciences
3rd National Conference on Cognitive Science, June 2011, Paros, Greece
In this announcement I focus on embodied cognition and skillful coping, and especially the way man, while using tools and objects, interacts with his world and renders himself at the same structural level with it, eliminating -in a sense- the distinction between agent and the world.
Heidegger, Neurosciences and the Exemption from the Descartes' Error
Philosophy and Neurosciences, Dasein Lab Workshop, April 2011, Athens, Greece. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.21334.70727
In my paper I present the convergence of Heideggerian theory and Cognitive Neurosciences and at the same time I attempt to formulate a hypothesis for the naturalistic foundation of meaning, as a property of human intelligence.
Intentionality and the Emergence of Meaning
Philosophia - Annual Journal of the Research Centre for Greek Philosophy of the Academy of Athens, v.41, pp 319-321, 2011. ISSN 1105-2120
In my thesis I attempt, on one hand, to classify certain basic problems of the philosophy of mind (as intentionality, the mind - body problem, qualia and the subjective experience of the world), while on the other hand, I am trying to formulate a hypothesis for the naturalistic foundation of human mind and intelligence.
Heidegger and Artificial Intelligence
Dasein Lab Workshop, 2010
An introduction to Heideggerian Artificial Intelligence on the occasion of the translation in Greek of the proposal by Hubert Dreyfus (2007): “Why Heideggerian AI failed and how fixing it would require making it more Heideggerian”.
Why Heideggerian AI Failed and How Fixing It Would Require Making it More Heideggerian - by Hubert L. Dreyfus, Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):247 – 268 (2007) - Part 1
Translation in Greek by Alkis Gounaris
Why Heideggerian AI Failed and How Fixing It Would Require Making it More Heideggerian - by Hubert L. Dreyfus, Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):247 – 268 (2007) - Part 2
Translation in Greek by Alkis Gounaris
Why Heideggerian AI Failed and How Fixing It Would Require Making it More Heideggerian - by Hubert L. Dreyfus, Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):247 – 268 (2007) - Part 3
Translation in Greek by Alkis Gounaris
